Note
to Bucknell Workshop readers. Introductory comments.
I wanted to say a few words about what I hoped to accomplish in the first chapter of the critical commentary to maximize the helpfulness of people's feedback.
My goal was to establish the
paradigmatic nature of neoclassical theory in order to permit criticism of
it. Mainstream textbooks try to
"command belief" in neoclassical economics in the name of science. I wanted to challenge that command by elaborating
the idea of paradigms and arguing that neoclassical theory was but one possible
way of thinking about the economy. My
goal was to open a window for alternative perspectives.
In teaching heterodox economics in
upper level elective courses, I have found the best students to be excited by
the idea of paradigms and emboldened to criticize neoclassical theory as a
paradigm. I am not sure this reaction
will be widespread in principles courses.
I fear that the chapter is likely to
be difficult reading for many undergraduates and am not sure what to do about
this. Part of me wants to write the
first draft of the critical commentary book for a motivated and well prepared
audience (and revise it later for a
larger audience). Another part of me believes that the real challenge is to
make the ideas accessible and engaging to a large audience, and that coverage
and complexity should be sacrificed to readability.
I'd like advice on whether the
chapter is readable enough for a non-trivial audience of principles
students. I'd also appreciate
suggestions on what sections might be deleted to shorten the text and make it
more focused. I use all of the stuff in
the chapter in my senior seminar on paradigm debates in economics to lay the
groundwork for many different critiques of neoclassical theory. It's therefore difficult for me to delete
stuff that I sense is non-essential-so help would be great.
Thanks,
Steve
PREFACE
This book is about philosophical
debates in economics. It critiques
conventional economic theory and standard introductory economics
textbooks. It is designed to make you
think. Socrates argued that “an
unexamined life is not worth living”.
The same can be said of textbooks, an unexamined argument is not worth
reading.
Conventional textbook[i] economic theory is based on many
assumptions. We will explore these
assumptions and suggest when they may be
unreasonable. Conventional
textbook economic theory tells a lot of stories. We will look critically at these stories and analyze when they
seem analogous to real life and when they may be misleading. Conventional
textbook economics also offers a framework for designing public policy. We will explore when it’s wise and unwise to
listen to conventional economists’ policy recommendations.
In short, we will offer a different
pair of glasses with which to look at economic issues from the spectacles
provided by conventional or what is
called “NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS”. [1]
Our pair of glasses draws on ideas from many different schools of thought,
including: institutional economics,
radical economics, Marxian economics,
feminist economics, and ecological economics.[2] For now, we will term the lens “HETERODOX ECONOMICS”. We will give a
more precise definition in chapter 2.
Our claim is not that conventional economics is totally wrong, but that
its assumptions and ways of reasoning are valid in much more modest contexts
than it implies. We will try to define
the terrain upon which neoclassical theory should and shouldn’t be used.
Hopefully many of you will find that
the book gives you a new way of seeing the world and that will be
exciting. The book should give those
preferring to retain old glasses, more powerful vision through them. To paraphrase John Stuart Mill, a famous
philosopher and economist of the 19th century, one who only
understands their own position and not that of competing frameworks, doesn’t
understand their own position very well.
Perhaps the most important thing the
book can impart is the realization that learning involves competing theories
and active choices about how to think about things. A good education gives you many sets of glasses and a disciplined
mind to chose amongst them.
Where
We Are Going. We begin with two
introductory chapters. Chapter 1
discusses the nature of philosophical debates in economics. Chapter 2 develops
an alternative approach to economic theory from that offered in conventional
introductory textbooks. Subsequent
chapters apply the ideas outlined in
chapter 2 to the topics of conventional
textbooks. Appendix A matches the
book’s chapters to those in the most widely used conventional texts. The appendix also briefly outlines the
subject matter of each chapter so that it can be matched to textbooks not
specifically listed in the appendix.
Final
Word. Theories and paradigms are
like tools; they are generally designed to be used, to address some question,
to aid in accomplishing some end. This
book is animated by the desire to understand economic outcomes so that a more
just and humanly satisfying economy can be created. There are other possible projects, such as trying to predict
stock prices or trying to find mathematical models that illuminate human social
interactions. These projects overlap
and diverge at times from the book’s deserdirata. Such is the nature of
paradigms. [ii]
INTRODUCTION: PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATES IN ECONOMICS
***
A riddle. A
man and his son are driving to a championship football game. It is late December and the roads are
covered with snow. They hit a patch of
ice and crash into a telephone pole.
The father is killed instantly.
An ambulance rushes the son to a nearby hospital and operating
room. The doctor walks in and
say’s, “I can’t operate, that’s my
son”. How could this be true? Whatever your answer was to the riddle,
assume that it was incorrect and come up with a second answer.[iii]
We will return to this riddle.
***
A paradigm is a conceptual framework, a context for organizing
thought. It is like a pair of
theoretical spectacles used to observe and think about the world. There are competing paradigms for
understanding the economy, competing frameworks for organizing economic
theory. This chapter explores why
competing paradigms (such as neoclassical economics, Marxist economics, and
ecological economics) exist.
EPISTEMOLOGICAL ISSUES.
Thinking is hard. Thinking
about thinking (epistemology) is even harder, but that is where we must begin
if we are to fully understand economic debates. Epistemology refers to the study of the nature of knowledge,
including how we determine what is true and even what we mean by “truth”. We shall begin by comparing two simple
models of knowing: the “blank slate” theory of knowledge and the “paradigmatic”
or “gestalt” theory of knowledge. Page
constraints require that we skip over many subtle and fascinating issues, but
if our brief inquiry whets your appetite, you might think about enrolling in a philosophy course that reads thinkers
such as Descartes, Locke, Hume, Popper, and Kuhn.
Blank Slate (Positivist)
Theories of Knowledge. Most people in our society, including most economists, accept a blank
slate theory of knowledge, often without explicit recognition. For many people, blank slate claims seem
commonsensical and self-evident.
The blank slate theory of
knowledge is often associated with empiricist philosophers. It imagines that the mind confronts the
world directly. Individuals have
experiences from which they generate ideas. It is as if ideas were “imminent”
or pregnant in experience. You stick
your hand in a fire and generate the idea “hot”. You look at a rose and generate the idea “beautiful”. Your mind
reflects the world as if it were a mirror. The world writes on you as if you
were a blank slate.
The world’s scribblings and
reflections, however, are not always
easy to interpret. After sticking your
hand in a fire, you might, for example,
mistakenly think that orangeness causes pain. Blank slate theories of knowledge thus require that all “imminent
ideas” be treated as hypotheses and elevated to the status of provisional
knowledge only after surviving
experimental tests. (The idea
that orangeness causes pain, for example, would presumably be jettisoned after
eating your first orange.)
There is often a universality
to blank slate knowledge claims.
Because everyone can in principle do the same experiments, all thinkers
should eventually arrive at the same ideas.
Variants of blank slate epistemology lie behind many popular expositions
of the “scientific method”. Science commands
our belief because it generates falsifiable (testable) propositions from
experience and logical deductions. All
scientists should eventually reach the same conclusions.
Conventional economic theory
tends to adopt blank slate (positivist) epistemology. It thinks of itself as a science, whose conclusions command
belief. We shall see shortly why some
economists disagree.
Paradigmatic Theories of
Knowledge. The paradigmatic view of knowledge argues
that the mind never perceives the world directly or experience sensations,
innocently, that is, untranslated, or unmediated by a person’s prior conceptual
framework. Everyone is always wearing
theoretical spectacles and thinking within some paradigm. What one sees is a product of what “is out
there” and the lens used to study
it.
The pictures below provide a simple (and perhaps dangerously
oversimplified) introduction to this idea.
Look at them and write down what you see. Assume they came from a book about a young woman drinking wine.
PICTURES
(wine
goblet/faces; young/old woman)
I suspect that most of you saw
an attractive young lady and some wine
glasses. Some of you saw an old lady
and some faces. Why? If you look closely at the pictures you
should be able to see both versions of each figure. The pictures represent classic examples of figure-ground
reversals, studied in perceptual research.
Although looking at the same picture, we perceive different scenes. By
organizing the lines in different ways in our minds, we can “see” different
things. In much more subtle ways,
paradigmatic theories of knowledge claim that economists and other social
theorists in competing paradigms “see” different things and understand the
workings of the social world differently.
From a paradigmatic perspective, observation and thinking are active rather than passive processes. Instead of simply reflecting what is “out there” the
observer partially constructs what
she sees. As a first approximation, it
is helpful to think about paradigms influencing thought in four main ways: by their impact on: (1) the data attended
to; (2) the abstractions used to organize data; (3) the language used to convey
ideas; and (4) the way in which new theories are tested.
(I) Data Attended To. As the philosopher William
James noted, without editing sensations, (that is without focusing on some sensory
inputs and ignoring others), the world would be a “bloomin’ buzzin’ confusion”.[iv]
People’s conceptual frameworks help provide that editing, by telling people,
“look here, and not there.” One’s theory of the mind, for instance, helps
determine what psychologists and other counselors “hear” when they interview
people.
For example, consider the idea of a “Freudian slip”. According to Freudian psychology, the mind is multidimensional, including
conscious and unconscious levels..
Occasionally, instinctual energy from the unconscious bubbles into overt
behavior, circumventing subconscious and conscious censors in devious
ways. What a non-Freudian might treat
as a inconsequential typographical error or slip of the tongue, becomes for a
Freudian a key piece of data, a window into the unconscious. When Freudian counselors “listen” to their
patients, they often listen more for the silences (censored utterances) and
irregularities (Freudian slips) than for explicit remarks. Non-Freudians listen and hear differently.
Similarly, some contemporary physicists build special instruments to
explore the nature of matter. The
instruments exist because of the presence of a theory that implies the
existence of special particles (solar neutrinos) that can be measured by the instruments. Without the theory we would not have the instruments or data
about the particles. We wouldn’t “see” them. In fact, we never do “see them”; we record
some effects, which given our
theory, we interpret as their
“reflections”.
As we shall discover shortly,
different economic paradigms allow one to “see” different things. The paradigms orient us to different data
and to different questions about the data.
Conventional GNP statistics, for example, attempt to measure national economic
output. They leave out, however, the
value of things produced in the home for family use (because they are not
priced in markets) and the value of social maintenance (that is the cultivation
of inter-personal ties that transform a group of people into a community). Feminists economists note that such
oversights are not random, they often
exclude the experiences and contributions of women in the economy.
Ecological economists have criticized GNP statistics for their
incomplete treatment of “natural capital” (such as exhaustible resources
or the earth’s capacity to absorb
wastes). We’ll explore what this means
in the text. The point here is that
even the numbers that economists use to “describe” the level of a country’s
economic activity reflect paradigmatic visions. There is no neutral, objective, “theory-less” scale with which to
measure economic activity.
(II) Abstractions Used to
Organize Data. Even when two observers
“see” similar objects, people from different paradigms may organize their
observations differently. People’s
conceptual frameworks provide the categories (the concepts or abstractions) for
linking and integrating observations.
Marxist and feminist economists, for example, organize economic
observations about inequality with respect to the customs and institutions of a social system. They knit together their analysis with
categories that link individual actions
to culturally given social roles.
Neoclassical economists talk about individuals rather than social systems
and have few categories or concepts linking individual behaviors to social
structures. (Precisely what this
distinction means will occupy us in chapter 2)
III)
The Language Used. Almost all paradigms develop specialized
languages by using familiar words in special ways and occasionally creating new
terms. Just as a paradigm’s abstract
concepts are linked together, it’s language is interactively constructed. Groups of
words are often used reciprocally to define each other.
The
language of a conceptual framework inevitably shapes how questions are posed
and how events are understood. Even
when “jargon” appears to be absent because of the presence of familiar words,
the paradigm’s specialized use of these words imposes it’s voice on the
discussion. This book will try to point out to you how your main textbook is
shaping your thinking through its paradigmatic use of language. By emphasizing the “constitutive impact” of
language on thought, paradigmatic epistemology challenges the tendency of blank
slate epistemology to treat language as a neutral medium for conveying prior
and universal ideas.
One
of the problems in attempting to compare paradigms is the tendency for
participants in one paradigm to translate the ideas from another paradigm into
their own language. When this happens, the translated ideas often lose the
meaning that they had in their original language. Learning a second paradigm is
like learning a foreign language, you don’t really have command of the
alternative paradigm until you learn to think in it directly, without
translating. Because learning a new
paradigm is a major investment, most neoclassical economists are relatively
unfamiliar with the “real” content of heterodox paradigms. This commentary will try to point out where
the quick and dirty translations offered in conventional microeconomic
textbooks of heterodox ideas break down.
Because of most readers’ lack of background in alternative paradigms,
even our discussion will lose some of the richness of alternative economic
theories.
(IV) Ways of Testing Theories. People
holding blank slate ideas about epistemology can accept that paradigms initially
influence the data attended to and the abstractions used to organize data
without abandoning many blank slate conclusions. The key question is whether paradigms condition the way theories
(and paradigms themselves) are tested and evaluated. From a blank slate perspective, it seems relatively easy to
discredit incorrect paradigms.
Experiments can be designed to test whether one conceptual framework
explains the world better than another.
The results can be evaluated “objectively” and all observers quickly
converted to a common paradigm.
From a paradigmatic perspective, things are trickier. People’s conceptual frameworks inevitably
influence how they test their theories. People tend to respond to failed
predictions or data that challenges their ideas by making minor modifications
within their existing conceptual frameworks.
People seldom shift conceptual
frameworks. When doctors become baffled by a new disease , for example,
they do not jettison the germ theory of disease, they try to refine it so it
can be applied to the anomalous case.
When a Freudian psychoanalyst’s treatment of a patient’s phobia fails to
“cure” the patient, the analyst does not give up Freudian theory, he tries to
find another explanation for the person’s behavior within Freudian
theory. Even when answers are not found
for anomalous cases, most thinkers tolerate the anomalies on the assumption that
answers will be found in the future.
We shall see the same tendency to search for answers within existing
paradigms in economics when, for instance, economists mispredict inflation
and unemployment rates. Classical
economics asserted that markets automatically produced full employment without
government assistance. In the great depression the U.S. economy averaged about
18% unemployment for nearly a decade.
The unemployment rate peaked at about
25% in 1932. Rather than reject
the notion of automatic full employment, the “New Classical” economists made
minor changes in their models which allowed them to explain the depression
without giving up their full-employment, laisse-faire policy conclusions.
In contrast with Classical economists, Keynesians argue that capitalist
economies can have unemployment problems.
In the 1960s the Keynesians
argued that too little aggregate demand caused unemployment and too much
aggregate demand caused inflation. The
stagflation of the late 1970s (simultaneous unemployment and inflation)
appeared as devastating for existing Keynesian theory as the great depression
was for Classical economic theory.
However, just like the New Classical theorists, the Post-Keynesians made
modest changes within Keynesian
theory which allowed it to explain stagflation without abandoning its basic ideas[CC1].
Orthodox Marxist economists have appealed to their own epicycles to
reconcile their failed predictions (for example that profit rates have a
tendency to fall in mature capitalist economies) to the data. These epicycles
(by Marxists, Classical economists, Keynesians, etc) are not constructed in bad
faith. They are not debating tricks
devised by partisans to save face. They
reflect a reasoned way of seeing the world within a conceptual framework.
Put material
below in a box?
Thomas Kuhn provides the classic example of paradigmatic reasoning in
his study of the history of earth centered astronomy. From before the second century BCE until ~1500 CE, astronomers, philosophers, and educated
observers believed that the sun rotated around the earth. This belief was part of a larger conceptual
framework that linked ideas about the natural world with religious beliefs and
ideas about the nature of human society.
The science of the period sought to explain how things worked and
why the universe took the form it did.
Astronomers predicted the motion
of the heavenly bodies with models that assumed the planets orbited the earth
in circular fashion. They also argued
that this was because the circle was the most perfect form and the earth the
most important object in the universe.
These thinkers would have rejected any explanation of the motion of the
planets that didn’t include a coherent reason for why the planetary system took
the form it did. The assumption that
the universe had a purposeful design was called the “principle of sufficient
reason” (check[CC2]).
Like modern scientists the astronomers were accountable to the
facts. When observations contradicted
their predictions, as they did as telescopes improved, they amended their
theory to make it consistent with the facts.
As figure #
illustrates, the appearance of observation 7 challenged the assumption
of circular orbits. After satisfying themselves that the
anomalous or puzzling data was not due to mismeasurement, the astronomers
attempted to revise their theories to incorporate the new information. Their answer: the universe was even more perfect than they had realized. The heavenly bodies orbited the earth in
circles on circles, or epicycles (see figure ## below). When even better telescopes discovered
continuing divergences from predicted epicyclic orbits, the astronomers
theorized epicycles on epicycles.
Thomas Kuhn has demonstrated that such a system can in fact “explain”
(successfully predict) the appearance of astronomical motions in the night sky.[3]
Insert figures
The model flourished for about 1700 years. Modern science has rejected an
earth-centered astronomy in favor of a sun-focused solar system with elliptical
orbits. It has entirely given up the
project of explaining why the universe takes the form it does. Modern science does not argue that the
ellipse is a more perfect form than the circle; it simply ignores the question
of why the universe has the form it does.[[4]] One of the major battles between different
paradigms often concerns what are legitimate and important questions. Conventional economics, for example, argues
that where consumer tastes come from is not a legitimate question for
economics. Other paradigms of economic
theory disagree
End of Box
Let us return now
to the riddle about the doctor and the football game. I have asked it for twenty years in my introductory economics
classes. There
tend to be
two sets of answers . The first group
offers couplets, like:
“ (1) The doctor gave his sperm to a sperm bank and the boy was
fathered from the bank. (2) The doctor
was God.”
“(1) …by using this tack he
(the doctor) wants to increase his wage…(2) His mother may have married twice.”
“ (1) The doctor is very
confused. (2) The boy was messed up beyond recognition.”
“(1) It was a supernatural event….(2) The doctor
(is) … a part time priest.”
“(1) Boy’s dead father was
adoptive father. (2) Father in car was
Catholic priest.”
The second group includes the possibility that the doctor
is the boy’s mother. There is no reason
to assume that this is the case, but the interesting thing about the riddle is
the degree to which traditional stereotypes prevent some people from even considering the
possibility. Many students (both male
and female) make revision after revision in their answers (epicycle) without conceiving of the possibility that
the doctor may be a woman. Such is the
power of paradigms; they assert
themselves before you think and before you “see”, to some extent, they
think and see for you.[5] We shall see this is the case for economic
paradigms and to some extent the purpose of this book is to “problematize” or
“de-naturalize” neoclassical theory, so
you can choose to think within or outside of its boundaries.
Normal Science and Scientific Revolutions
Thomas
Kuhn, the most famous historian and philosopher of science of the 20th
century, provides a very useful way of thinking about the impact of paradigms
on scientific research. He
distinguishes between “normal science” which takes place within the dominant
existing paradigm and “scientific revolutions”, which involve paradigm
shifts. The latter resemble gestalt
shifts. They go beyond integrating new
information into a pre-existing conceptual framework; they redefine the meaning given to old information, much like the
background/ground shifts in perception noted above.
From a blank slate perspective it would be imagined that the causes of
a scientific revolution are the accumulation of intolerable contradictions
within the old framework and the emergence from the data of a self-evidently
superior new framework.
Kuhn’s historical studies paint a more complex picture. The superiority of new frameworks often
appears only after the jettisoned paradigm has atrophied. The superiority may be as much a result as a
cause of the scientific revolution. It
is not clear that the boundaries of older systems could not have been stretched
to compete with the triumphant framework.
The allegiance of obvious
geniuses. such as Albert Einstein, to
“defeated” paradigms suggest that choices are not simple matters of logical
deduction. Like many human judgments
there often appear to be cultural and sociological factors involved with
determining what seems a reasonable way to think about something.
A paradigm is like a language. It evolves through shared use. The community of people who work within a
paradigm determine how it develops.
Their judgments are usually influenced by the projects they wish to
pursue. As we will see in chapter 2, neoclassical and heterodox economists have
often wanted to pursue different projects and so taken economic theory in
different directions. The result is the
paradigm debate described in this book.
***
INTERMISSION
Some Study and
Discussion Questions
I) Simple
Study Questions (making sure you got the basic ideas)
1) What is meant by the term
“paradigm”? Compare and contrast
paradigmatic and blank slate epistemologies.
2) How does a paradigm influence thinking?
3) What is meant by the
terms: “normal science”,
“epicycle”, and “scientific
revolution”?
II) More
Thought Provoking Discussion Questions
1A) Blank slate theorists
imagine that history (and a college history course) is like a movie about the
past. The course “playsback” what happened as if the instructor or the textbook
were a cam corder that recorded (and later reflected back) the events that
transpired. What alternative
cinematic metaphors for the telling of history might a paradigmatic theorist
use?
1B) Why according to the
paradigmatic perspective is the writing of history (say the history of the US
from 1700-1900) more than narrative reporting?
2) Read pages 1-9 in Thomas
Kuhn’s famous book: The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. What is the image of science that Kuhn is
attacking?
3) Explain what Kuhn means
in the quotes below from the above reading.
A) “Scientific fact and theory are not categorically
separable, except perhaps within a single tradition of normal-scientific
practice. That is why the unexpected
discovery is not simply factual in its import and why the scientist’s world is
qualitatively transformed as well as quantitatively enriched by fundamental
novelties of either fact or theory.” (p. 7)
B) Observations and experience can and must
drastically restrict the range of admissible scientific belief, else there
would be no science. But they cannot
alone determine a particular body of belief.
An apparently arbitrary element, compounded of personal and historical
accident, is always a formative ingredient of the beliefs espoused by a given
scientific community at a given time.” (p. 4)
4) Assess the following
claims from the perspective of paradigmatic epistemology,
“The problem is that
everyone is limited by their paradigm.
What we need to develop is a paradigm free science, then we could free
ourselves from bias.”
“I know we interpret the
world differently, but let’s look at the facts”’
5) Simple translating
machines can offer definitions of words in a foreign language. Why might the task of designing a
“translating machine” be a complicated one (i.e., why can’t you use the
computer’s massive memory to simply match each foreign word with the appropriate
English word)? What does the complexity
of translation suggest about the nature of knowledge?
***
End of
Intermission
Refinements of Paradigmatic Epistemology
Implications for Reading Introductory Textbooks
Learning New Paradigms. How do people learn new paradigms, such as neoclassical,
institutionalist, or Marxist economics, that is how do people learn to
“see” and to think in new and distinctive ways? The answer to this question will tell us a lot about the logic and structure of your
micro textbook.
The goal of introductory econ classes is frequently stated as teaching
students to “think like economists” (read neoclassical economists) which means
teaching students to approach economic questions in a certain way, to think
within a particular conceptual framework and not to think like an historian, an
anthropologist, or a non-neoclassical economist. In other words, the goal of your textbook is to initiate you into
the neoclassical paradigm.
Learning a paradigm involves
learning abstract principles and concrete examples of their application, what
Thomas Kuhn calls “shared exemplars”.
Kuhn notes that by studying a series of examples, students learn to see new problems as variants of
previously solved problems. Thus learning a paradigm can be said to involve
learning to draw the appropriate analogies, to highlight some characteristics
of two situations and suppress others.
In learning neoclassical economics, intro texts teach students what to
attend to and what to ignore in economic analysis; what questions to ask and what questions to suppress.[6]
Teaching a paradigm resembles sharing a worldview. The goal is to construct a context within
which certain “stories” can be told as the audience fills in the gaps with
expected background. The capacity to
draw appropriate analogies and supply the necessary background is sometimes
called “tacit knowledge.”
Your textbook is designed to cultivate that knowledge, with the topics
selected for discussion, the examples offered, even the jokes shared (in the text and in class) geared towards
teaching you to fit a multi-dimensional
reality into the boxes offered by neoclassical economics. This chiseling of the world into a
paradigmatic narrative is attempted by all paradigms and is not a flaw in the
neoclassical approach. In order to study
reality we must simplify it and look at it from some angle. Paradigm debates are about what
simplifications and angles of vision to use, not about whether to use
simplifications.
In criticizing the angle of vision offered in your textbook we will critique all of the techniques by
which your text constructs the neoclassical paradigm. In particular:
1)
We
will criticize the abstract principles the text explicitly offers for analyzing
economic activity.
2)
We
will dissect the text’s “shared exemplars” and try to show why these examples
may miss fundamental aspects of the topics they claim to illuminate
3)
We
will examine the system of analogy that the text tries to develop and attempt
to show why the “shared exemplars” may not generate satisfactorily offspring
even when helpful for thinking about their original problem
4)
We
will draw attention to the questions
ignored and subjects suppressed in economics by the adoption of a neoclassical
perspective
5)
We
will critique the language and metaphors used by the textbook to conform
discussion to neoclassical ways of thinking
In sum, we will critique the “tacit assumptions” underlying
neoclassical analysis and its basic framework.
We will try to problematize the arguments your textbook tries to
“naturalize” by suggesting alternatives to what the text portrays as the
“natural” way to “see” the world. We will give special attention to the
stories and imagery conjured up by neoclassical language, for as McCloskey
notes (quoting Rorty), “It is pictures rather than propositions, metaphors
rather than statements, which determine most of our philosophical [and
economic] convictions (75).”
Conclusion: Some Implications of Paradigmatic Theory of
Knowledge
for Social Science
and Economics
(1) Centrality of paradigms to research results. The paradigmatic model of knowledge emphasizes the impact of conceptual frameworks on research findings. It recommends focusing carefully on the
basic assumptions that define a paradigm’s organization of inquiry. Because these assumptions are frequently
taken for granted and only “tacitly” acknowledged, it’s often difficult to
realize the limitations of the frame of reference one is learning. This book tries to remind you of the
limitations of the glasses you put on when you look at the world and like a
conventional neoclassical economist.
(2) Distinguishing between inter and
intra-paradigm debates. The
paradigmatic framework also suggests that
it is very helpful to distinguish between inter-and intra-paradigm debates. Debates between
members of the same paradigm (intra-paradigm debates) are much more easily
resolved by empirical data because the participants are wearing the same
glasses and asking similar questions.
Inter-paradigm debates are frequently mired in confusion. It is often as if an accountant asked a poet which is larger the letter k or the
letter z.
(3) Indeterminacy of paradigm debates. Because proponents of different paradigms
epicycle within their own conceptual frameworks, it is difficult to resolve
paradigm debates. This problem is
confounded by the fact that each paradigm tends to define what the important
issues are a bit differently, so what appears a devastating gap to one observer
may be an acceptable anomaly to another.
(4) Pedagogical implications. The paradigmatic framework has interesting
implications for how people learn new ideas.
It envisions a two step process.
Any new paradigm must initially be learned within the language and
categories of an old paradigm. This is
inevitably unsatisfying as some of the categories of the new paradigm don’t
really fit in the existing paradigm’s categories. Eventually, after enough of the new paradigm has been absorbed,
however imperfectly within the categories of the old paradigm, a paradigm shift
can occur. The new ideas are
reconfigured in line with their own logic.
This reorganization is often characterized as the “A ha” experience, and
represents a gestalt shift. It’s an
exciting moment.
Final Questions for Discussion and Review
1) For each of the blank slate characterizations
listed below offer a paradigmatic alternative and explain your reasoning.
Category Blank Slate Paradigmatic
Concept Alternative
Nature of Descriptive
Observation
Nature of Neutral Medium
Language for
Conveying Ideas
Nature of Passive
The Knower
Nature of Objective, Universal
Truth
2) Evaluate the statements below from a paradigmatic
perspective.
A) “We all agree on the important questions in economics, but different
paradigms come up with different answers to these questions.”
B) While the examples of economic reasoning in introductory texts are
helpful in introducing students to economic ideas, the neoclassical paradigm
could be conveyed entirely by detailing its abstract principles.
[1] Is it fair to judge neoclassical economics by its introductory textbooks which necessarily simplify the theory in order to teach it to beginning students? It is possible that most of the criticisms of textbook economics presented in this commentary are attacks on a strawman, easily parried by his older brother, “profman”? I don’t think so. While the mathematics gets more complicated and the applications of the theory more ingenious, the basic ideas of econ 101 echo in upper-level undergraduate courses, graduate courses, and scholarly journals. Introductory textbooks necessarily focus on the central ideas of a theory. What’s included (or excluded) in neoclassical intro texts often reveals more about the underlying ideas of neoclassical theory than the structure of advanced graduate courses. Because most standard introductory microeconomics texts do capture the core of neoclassical theory, the authors are not shy about offering unqualified public policy recommendations based on the simplified analyses presented in the texts.
[2] Among other schools comprising heterodox economics are Post Keynesian economics, humanistic economics, socio-economics, Austrian economics and contextual economics.
[3] Check Kunh 61-62 deferents.
[4]Modern physics has similarly given up Einstein's pursuit of a deterministic physics and posits that the world is probabilistic at the sub atomic level. Given exactly the same pre-conditions quantum mechanics implies that different outcomes are possible, implying a fundamental randomness to the universe. Einstein believed that the apparent randomness was due to incomplete information and demanded that physics search for the hidden cause of different outcomes. The debate over whether the universe is deterministic or stochastic is ultimately an aesthetic debate and not really resolvable by appeal to data. Economists, in much the same way, debate whether macroeconomics can be fully grounded in micro economics- or whether human action can be formally modeled.
[5] I have had several interesting experiences telling
this riddle. On one occasion one of my
male students repeated the riddle back to me to make sure he understood
it. When he came to the end of the
riddle the young man said, “And the doctor walks and he says I can’t operate that’s my son.” I indicated that he had the riddle just about right, but not
exactly right, and repeated the story with the correct phrasing at the end
(“And the doctor walks in and says I can’t operate that’s my son.” The student could not identify the
difference between our renditions of the riddle. I narrowed the focus to the last phrase, but the student remained
unable to hear my description without inserting the word “he” in his
reproduction. It was a powerful example
of the impact of preconceived notions on the data attended to.
About 20 years ago I told the riddle to two female medical students.
They did not include the boy’s mother in their answer. One can speculate about what this implied
about their medical school’s treatment of women.
The fluctuations in student responses to the riddle over the last 20
years is interesting. For the first
5-10 years the percentage including “the doctor is the boy’s mother” grew, peaking
at a little more than half. More
recently the number has been falling, dipping below 50%..
[6] McCloskey offers a helpful discussion of the impact of paradigms on economic reasoning in her analysis of the role of metaphors and analogy in economics. She writes, (quoting from Perelman and Olbrechts) “’… the acceptance of an analogy … is often equivalent to a judgment as to the importance of the characteristics that the analogy brings to the fore’ (82-83).” She then analyzes Gary Becker’s characterization of children as durable goods, “ A beginning at literal translation would say, ‘A child is costly to acquire initially, lasts for a long time, gives flows of pleasure during that time, is expensive to maintain and repair, has an imperfect second-hand market…the list of similarities could be extended further and further-gradually revealing the differences as well—“ (77) While no neoclassical economist would equate a refrigerator with a child, the paradigm does assert the priority of the metaphor, over, for example, the metaphor of a child as a “Thou” in Martin Buber’s language, a presence with which people can have “human” as opposed to “object” relations. What neoclassical theory does with its metaphors, models, and analogies is to give priority to thinking about the world in a particular way. Students and other potential users of economic paradigms have to decide whether the language and categories of neoclassical theory are an adequate framework for organizing analysis of the economy.
[i] I might want to put an end
note commenting on the difference between “intro textbook” economic theory and
“high theory” or “journal” theory. In
part this is because the neoclassicals are likely to defend their paradigm with
appeals to “qualifying” statements.. In
response I would argue that they are responsible for the import of the
“simplifications” made. What they have
chosen to retain and what they have swept under the rug (implicitly acknowledging
its unsightliness) throws into relief what they think is important about their
theory and what they want its message to be.
One could argue that the theory’s underlying sense of itself and its
mission is best revealed by the dichotomy between intro arguments and more
qualified scholarship.
For example, most neoclassical economists believe
that markets function very well,. They
thus feel comfortable with omitting discussion of disequilibrium dynamics from
intro texts. Their omission is not
primarily due to the difficulty of dynamic modeling. You need not use differential equations to raise disequilibrium
concerns. The omission reflects an
implicit judgment about the importance of the topic excluded.
[ii] Perhaps I should begin the
book with a series of stories and ask what they teach us about economics, or
pick stories from econ texts and ask what students find useful or strange in
the stories.
[iii] Possible alternative
version of the riddle: Two lawyers are
alone drinking at a bar discussing the day’s legal wrangling in a case where
they are on opposing sides. Suddenly
the judge from the trial walks into the tavern. One of the lawyers exits to the
washroom, since it is improper for opposing lawyers to discuss ongoing cases
outside of court. The remaining lawyer assures the judge that there have been
no other men at the bar. How could this
be true?
[iv] Some possible related quotes from Kuhn for cyber
space elaborated notes for the book.
“What a man sees depends both upon what he looks at and also upon what his
previous visual-conceptual experience has taught him to see. In the absence of such training there can
only be, in William James’s phrase, ‘a bloomin’ buzzin’ confusion’” (113)
“…one of the things a scientific community acquires with a paradigm is a criterion for choosing problems that, while the paradigm is taken for granted, can be assumed to have solutions. To a great extent these are the only problems that the community will admit as scientific or encourage its embers to undertake. Other problems, including many that had previously been standard, are rejected as metaphysical, as the concern of another discipline, or sometimes as just too problematic to be worth the time. A paradigm can, for that matter, even insulate the community from those socially important problems that are not reducible to the puzzle form, because they cannot be stated in terms of the conceptual and instrumental tools the paradigm supplies."”(37)
“Debates
over theory-choice cannot be cast in a form that fully resembles logical or
mathematical proof…Nothing about that relatively familiar thesis implies either
that there are no good reasons for being persuaded or … that the reasons for
choice are different from those usually listed by philosophers of science: accuracy, simplicity, fruitfulness, and the
like. What it should suggest, however,
is that such reasons …[can] be differently applied….. there is no neutral algorithm for theory-choice, no systematic
decision procedure which., properly applied, must lead each individual in the
group to the same decision” (199-200)